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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2007, I received two tickets to see the Detroit Pistons
play the Washington Wizards at the Verizon Center in Washington, D.C.
on January 2, 2008. The tickets were purchased using Craigslist.org, an
online marketplace. The tickets themselves were premium seats, only ten
rows behind the visiting bench, and they were purchased at a price below
face value. The seller was not a career ticket broker, but merely someone
trying to unload tickets to an event he could not attend.

* J.D., 2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington; B.A., 2004,
The University of Michigan - Ann Arbor. This Note is dedicated to my father, Dr. Clark P.
Kirkman, whose selflessness has opened every door, and whose courage in the face of
adversity inspires me on a daily basis. I would like to thank the FCLJ Executive Board, as
well as my family and friends. In particular I would like to thank Anna, who has
consistently challenged me to be my best.
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While online transactions involving regular people are common,
professional ticket brokers are increasingly dominating the online ticket
resale market.' It is beyond dispute that this secondary market for event
tickets based on supply and demand will continue to exist in the United
States, at least absent some radical shift in policy by Congress and state
legislatures. The online resale market is growing rapidly; estimates of
annual sales over Web sites like StubHub, eBay, Craigslist, RazorGator,
TicketsNow, 2 Ticket Liquidator, and others totaled about $3 billion in
2006.' That number is expected to rise to $4.5 billion by 2012. 4 This
market success has compounded the enforcement problems currently
experienced by states that wish to crack down on scalping. "Because of the
consensual nature of purchasing a ticket ...as well as the anonymity of
Internet transactions, enforcing scalping laws across state borders may be
too costly." 5 "Legal gray areas" in the personal jurisdiction and choice-oflaw contexts also exist when bringing actions against these auction sites or
the brokers themselves. 6
Though the primary beneficiaries of this burgeoning market are the
resellers-who routinely make profits on tickets that more than double
their face value 7-- the substantial utility to the consumer that the market
provides should not be lost in the fray. First and foremost, the supply and
demand model in this situation works well enough so that, in most cases,
those who value attendance at an event the most will be able to attend.8
1. See Bruce Mohl, Multibillion-Dollar Industry Pressures States to Loosen
Restrictions on Resales, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2006, http://www.boston.com/business/
globe/articles/2006/10/22/multibilliondollarindustry_pressures_states to loosen-restricti
ons on resales/.
2. TicketsNow was purchased by Ticketmaster in January of 2008, and the merger has
come under fire recently. See Alfred Branch, Jr., Ticketmaster Buys TicketsNow,
TICKETNEWS.COM, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.ticketnews.com/Ticketmaster-Buys-Tickets
Now018155. This merger, and what it means going forward, will be examined in Part V,
infra.
3. Julie Gibson, Hot Tickets: The Move from Streetside Scalping to Online Ticket
Speculation,
THE
LAWYERS
WEEKLY,
May
9,
2008,
available at
http://www.lawyersweekly.calindex.php?section=article&articleid=676.
4. Press Release, MarketWatch.com, Ticket Resale Industry Protects Consumers with
Fair Market Prices and Secure Transactions (Feb. 4, 2009) (available at
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/090204 (follow hyperlink "7:53 PM Ticket Resale
Industry Protects Consumers With Fair Market Prices and Secure Transactions")).

5. Daniel J. Glantz, Note, For-Bid Scalping Online?:Anti-Scalping Legislation in an
Internet Society, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ErT. L.J. 261, 287 (2005).
6. See id. at 269.
7. See Hannah R. Short, Note, Implications of Grokster for Online Ticket Sale
Companies: Why Online Ticket Resale Sites Should Be Held Liable for Violating State
Scalping Laws, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 181, 194-95 (2005).
8. Scott D. Simon, Note, If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em. Implications for New
York's Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1171, 1208 (2004).
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Also, particularly for events that have not sold out, the secondary market
provided by scalpers increases competition among all ticket sellers. 9 In
such cases, if ticket scalpers did not make a business of reselling tickets, it
is possible that promoters might take the opportunity to charge a more
exorbitant price. Fans can also take advantage of the market forces of
supply and demand by waiting until the last minute to purchase a ticket that
is about to entirely lose its value to the scalper.1 0 Finally, at least for those
who can afford it, the secondary market alleviates the need to wait for
hours, or even days, in line for highly sought-after tickets. I
The ticket resale industry has taken on new attributes since
transforming into an online business. While the Internet has helped many
sectors of the economy grow in ways that were consistent with their preInternet model, the proliferation of online ticket resale markets has changed
the dynamic of how tickets to events are distributed, especially for the most
popular events. It can only be assumed that, if unchecked by public or
private actors, the industry will grow to control more and more retail ticket
purchases.
First, at least one software company, RMG Technologies, has been
identified as having designed and distributed software specifically targeting
Ticketmaster's (by far the biggest distributor of face-value tickets) Web
site in order to procure large quantities of tickets for RMG's broker
clients.' 2 Although Ticketmaster won both preliminary and permanent
injunctions against RMG, 13 the case highlights an emerging issue of how
tickets to events, nationwide, are susceptible to predatory practices by
middlemen who compete with regular concert-goers for a promoter's ticket
stock. To be sure, while the benefits of a ticket resale market have been
highlighted above, it is hard to make a case for a system which allows
middlemen to "cut in line" and comer the market on available tickets.
Another problem lies in actually enforcing laws against ticket resale.
Indeed, the historical justifications for anti-scalping statutes, as discussed
below, no longer seem to apply. As this Note will argue, the transformation
of the industry into a cyber marketplace, national in scope, calls for
Congress to act. Such a regulatory scheme, superseding regulation by the
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1187.
12. See Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 110203 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
13. Press Release, Ticketmaster, Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against
RMG Technologies, Inc. Entered in U.S. District Court: Ruling a Major Win for Consumer
Protection and Fan Access to Live Entertainment (June 25, 2008) (available at
http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-252008/000483902 1&EDATE=) [hereinafter Ticketmaster Default Judgment Press Release].
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individual states, will have the additional effect of remedying the personal
jurisdiction and choice of law legal gray areas by transferring jurisdiction
to the federal court system. Though some may argue that Congress, in this
regard, could be meddling in an area historically reserved for the states, the
interstate aspects endemic to the online ticket trade provide ample
justification for such measures.
For the good of both the consumer and those who participate in
hosting events nationwide, these public policy considerations must be taken
into account. Of course, promoters could set ticket prices at whatever they
deem fit, utilizing the market forces made possible by the Internet in order
to increase their profits; indeed, some have done exactly this. 14 However, it
is far from acceptable for legislatures, particularly Congress itself, to sit
idly by while "ticket brokers earn hundreds of thousands of dollars from an
entertainment product that the [artists or] teams-not the brokers-create
and develop."' 15 Some promoters have already taken16legal action against
middlemen who have been able to make such a living.
This Note seeks to provide insight into the rapidly developing online
ticket resale industry. Though ticket scalping is a business much older than
the Internet, opportunities online have allowed the market to redefine itself
and proliferate in a relatively short period of time. This Note will argue that
the growth of a secondary market based on supply and demand for ticket
sales in the United States, as a result of utilizing tools provided by the
Internet, has many advantages for the average consumer. Some consumers
have taken advantage of the opportunities this new market provides
including an increased ability to get tickets at the last minute, to get the best
seats to a particular event, and to be able to sell tickets that they are not
able to use themselves. Also, conducting these transactions online negates
many of the classic, nuisance-related rationales for the historical
criminalization of ticket scalping by states.
But, professional ticket brokers also have the opportunity and
motivation to abuse these tools. Promoters, when setting ticket prices, take
into account other factors besides simply how much they could charge for
each ticket. They have long recognized goodwill interests and the
promotion of a healthy fan base as legitimate reasons for making tickets
affordable to the public.
14. See Simon, supra note 8, at 1171, 1198 (quoting James Klenk, Attorney for the
Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field Premium Ticket Services, who speculated: "I think that
many more sports teams will be doing this.").
15. Anthony J. Dreyer & Mitchell P. Schwartz, Whose Game Is It Anyway: Sport
Teams' Right to Restrict (and Control) Ticket Resale, 17 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENr. L.J. 753, 755 (2007).
16. See, e.g., New England Patriots, L.P. v. Stubhub, Inc., 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 717,
(Mass. Super. July 31, 2007).

Number 3]

ONLINE TICKET RESALE PROBLEMS

When brokers purchase large blocks of tickets for resale at vastly
inflated prices, thereby capitalizing on promoters' attempts to set ticket
prices at affordable levels, the biggest loser is the consumer. Also,
computer software programs are being developed that give ticket brokers
unfair advantages. For events that are certain to be in high demand,
entering the secondary market may be the only way for consumers to get
their hands on a ticket. At the same time, many state legislatures--the
bodies that have historically regulated the industry-have scrapped their
anti-scalping statutes as "outmoded and largely ignored laws addressing a
bygone, pre-Internet era.' 17 These forces have some industry insiders
predicting an endgame, perhaps in as little as a decade, placing all ticket
sales at the mercy of supply and demand.18 Such an outcome would have a
disenfranchising effect on the less affluent and their ability to see their
favorite team or performer live.
Part II of this Note traces the history of the scalping industry, the rise
of the online market, and responses by various state legislatures. Part III
examines the circumstances surrounding the 2007 Hannah Montana: Best
of Both Worlds Tour, which saw some of the problems associated with
online ticket sales manifest themselves to a degree large enough to garner
the attention of the Attorneys General of Missouri and Arkansas. Part IV
examines the case of Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc.,' 9 in
which Ticketmaster alleged that the defendant software company was
manufacturing, soliciting, and distributing software that allowed client
ticket brokers to purchase large numbers of tickets while blocking average
consumers. 20 Part V analyzes where the ticket resale market is heading, and
asks questions about what can or should be done to ensure that the system
is fair to all. Specifically, the Author contends that national regulatory
action on the part of Congress is necessary to prevent the usurpation of
primary market ticket sales by the ticket broker industry. Only federal
action can adequately address problems ranging from ambiguities in
personal jurisdiction to the financial and personnel constraints endemic in
state attempts to regulate the online marketplace.

17. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 765.
18. See Mike Tierney, Show Stoppers?, ATLANTA J.&
available at 2006 WLNR 14411280 (Westlaw).
19. 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
20. Id. at 1102-03.

CONST.,

Aug. 20, 2006, at F-I
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II. HISTORY: FROM 'SCALPING' TO 'RESALE'
A.

Pre-InternetScalping andAnti-Scalping Legislation
At the heart of what it means to "be an American" is the idea that we
live in a free society; no sector of our society reflects this notion more
succinctly than our supply-and-demand, capitalistic economy. The U.S.
Supreme Court reached its apex in laissez-faire thinking in the early
twentieth century in the famous case of Lochner v. New York, zl which
struck down a New York statute prohibiting bakers from working more
than sixty hours in one week as an infringement upon one's due process
"freedom of contract" right. 22 Since the demise of Lochner and its progeny,
it has been recognized that the legislatures of the United States have the
authority to regulate sectors of the economy in need of regulation.2 3
A threshold question in examining ticket resale arises: Why are those
promoters and proprietors not taking advantage of the forces of supply and
demand? Why allow for the creation of a secondary market benefiting
neither those who perform nor those who own the facility? Indeed, the
secondary market has proven to be very valuable; in 1988, tickets to the
championship match at Great Britain's Wimbledon tennis tournament were
reportedly scalped at more than 3,500% of face value. 4 Aside from
focusing on the price for which tickets can be sold, event promoters take
many other factors into account when setting ticket prices. They must
figure out ways to drive demand for their product and create a "buzz" for
the event, which is worth more in the end than charging higher prices for
the tickets themselves. To generate high demand that outstrips supply for
event tickets, promoters set prices at levels far lower than what the public is
willing to pay. 5 Ticket prices may also be set at artificially low levels
because it can be difficult to predict demand months in advance of when
the tickets go on sale.2 6 Also, promoters-as well as performers---do not
discount the goodwill created by setting prices at reasonable levels.27 The
excitement generated by a performance selling out, as well as the value of
concessions and merchandise sold at these events, are also factors in ticket

21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).
24. Sheree Rabe, Note, Ticket Scalping: Free Market Mirage, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 57,
57-58 (1991). As we shall see, however, tools provided by the Internet have enticed some
promoters of late to utilize supply and demand in selling its tickets.
25. See Jonathan C. Benitah, Anti-Scalping Laws: Should They Be Forgotten?, 6 TEx.
REv. ENT. & SPORTS L. 55, 70 (2005).

26. See id,at 70-71.
27. Seeid.at71.
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pricing.
Particularly for performances aimed at lower-income
demographics, promoters attempt to29keep ticket prices at reasonable levels
in order to reach their target market.
Evidence of state regulation of ticket resale can be traced back over a
century. 30 Initially, such statutes did not survive constitutional challenges in
Lochner-era courts. It was judged that "scalping was a private enterprise
and therefore not 'affected with a public interest.' ''32 Later on, in the wake
of Nebbia v. New York,33 similar acts of state legislatures were scrutinized
under rational basis review, and many were upheld as a valid exercise of
the state's police power.34 Such statutes have been primarily based on two
policy objectives: first, mitigating the nuisance effect scalpers present at
venues, and second, protecting the profits of those who worked to put on
the event by limiting the development of a secondary market.35 One court
in New York also cited "the preservation of public welfare and
advancement of the arts and theater" as a reason to uphold such statutes.36
As this Note will demonstrate, while the first concern is not applicable in
the online context, the second policy objective is even more pronounced
today.
All of this is not to say that anti-scalping laws were in place
nationwide. In fact, in the early 1980s, "[1]ess than one-fourth of all states
[had] statutes that regulate[d] the resale price of tickets to entertainment
and sporting events. 37 Lobbying efforts by ticket scalpers predated the

28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Seeid. at58.
31. See, e.g., Tyson & Bros.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927); but see People ex rel. Cort Theater Co. v. Thompson, 119 N.E. 41 (11. 1918)
(holding that the city of Chicago, through its license agreement with promoters, could
prohibit relationships between promoters and scalpers).
32. Phyllis L. Zankel, Comment, Wanted: Tickets-A Reassessment of Current Ticket
Scalping Legislation and the Controversy Surrounding Its Enforcement, 2 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 129, 129 (1992) (quoting Tyson & Bros., 273 U.S. at 430.).
33. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
34. See Benitah, supra note 25, at 58-59.
35. See Robert E. Freeman & Daniel Gati, Internet Ticket Scalping: If You Can't Beat
'Em, Join 'Em, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2003, at 6.
36. Paul J. Criscuolo, Comment, Reassessing the Ticket Scalping Dispute: The
Application, Effects and Criticisms of Current Anti-Scalping Legislation, 5 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 189, 199 (1995) (citing People v. Johnson, 278 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1967)).
37. Thomas A. Diamond, Ticket Scalping: A New Look at an Old Problem, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 71, 74 (1982). At the time, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee were the
only states that had blanket statutory regulations in place. Id. at 74 n. 17. A few other states,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, had narrower
statutes that regulated certain spectacles such as boxing or wrestling events. Id.
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Internet era of ticket resale, and such efforts had their effect on state
legislatures.3 By 2000, however, with the advent of the online resale
industry, twenty-six states had laws that regulated the resale of tickets.39
Another major concern that historically occupied the minds of
lawmakers is a phenomenon known as "ice .... Ice' is money paid, in the
form of a gratuity, premium or bribe, in excess of the printed box office
price of a ticket, to an operator of any 'place of entertainment' or their
agent, representative or employee" 40 (i.e., a box office ticket salesperson).
As explained above, promoters do not discount the goodwill gained by
setting ticket prices low; 4 1 ice allows them to reap some of the benefits of
the secondary market without losing most of this goodwill.
While the secondary market dresses up as a genuine supply-anddemand-based free market, the concept of ice shows that the market is
instead based on bribery. 42 "Free markets, in order to function effectively
and competitively, cannot be built on the basis of fraud, deception and
manipulation. When 'private-market actors' engage in abuses of market
power, 'drive out competitors, or use monopoly power, the usual market
forms of discipline cease to operate."' 43 Although this Note will not
examine in depth the icing of ticket sales, parallels can be drawn between
the problems caused in the secondary ticket market by icing ticket sales and
problems due to the proliferation of the online ticket broker industry. This
serves as an instructive comparison which reiterates why state legislatures,
as well as Congress, should actively regulate the industry. When market
forces break down and give way to corruption, there is a disproportionate
ratio of winners to losers. Whereas benefits exist in injecting market forces
into the industry for both buyers and sellers, those benefits, at least for
buyers, greatly diminish when that market is blemished by illegality. In
both cases, the obvious byproduct is an unjust price increase. 44 Absent
meaningful regulation, both problems will only proliferate over time.

38. Seeid. at74.
39. See Jon Michael Gibbs, Comment, Cyberscalping: On-line Ticket Sales, 31 U. TOL.
L. REV. 471, 475 n.46 (2000) (listing all twenty-six states' relevant provisions).
40. Andrew Kandel & Elizabeth Block, The "De-Icing" of Ticket Prices: A Proposal
Addressing the Problem of Commercial Bribery in the New York Ticket Industry, 5 J. L. &
POL'Y 489, 489-90 (1997).
41. See Benitah, supra note 25, at 71-72.
42. See Kandel & Block, supra note 40, at 490 (quoting ROBERT KUTrNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 225 (1997)).
43. Id. at 492-93.
44. See id.at 497.
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B.

Growth of the Online Resale Industry
The history of Internet auction sites is still very much in its infancy.
The most notable Web site, eBay.com, was only founded in 1995. 45 In
2007, though, eBay transactions totaled nearly $60 billion. 46 Similarly, the
movement of ticket resale to the Internet venue has grown exponentially.
As noted above, StubHub, now a subsidiary of eBay,4 7 predicted in 2007
that their profits for that year would exceed their total profits for the
company's entire history. As more enterprises, such as sports teams,
contract with Web sites like StubHub to officially resell tickets, the
industry will continue to grow.48
Also increasing in complexity are the mechanisms by which the
government can regulate this burgeoning industry. As detailed above, states
have long regulated traditional ticket scalping; online transactions,
however, are commonly interstate in nature. This is especially true in the
case of professional brokers, who purchase large blocks of tickets-without
regard for where the particular venue is located-for distribution
nationwide. Indeed, "[t]he transaction can be deemed to occur in one of
several jurisdictions - where the seller or the buyer is located, the city
where the financial transaction is processed, or even the location of the
auction site's servers." 49 In such transactions, personal jurisdiction issues
abound. While a protracted discussion of personal jurisdiction issues in the
online context is beyond the scope of this Note, it is one of the legal gray
areas that make regulation of the online industry at the state level
inadequate.
Ticket brokers have done their best to establish themselves as agents
in a reputable business, indispensable to the public, rather than as parasitic
ticket scalpers long viewed as illegal in various jurisdictions. In 1994, the
National Association of Ticket Brokers (NATB) was established, launching
a national lobbying effort.50 Its stated mission is "to establish an industry45. eBay Media Center: About eBay, http://news.ebay.com/about.cfi (last visited Apr.
9, 2009).
46. Id.
47. See EBay Buying StubHub for $310M in Cash(Business [sic] Week),
http://www.natb.org/news/index.cfin?pg=newsdetail.cfrn&newslD=67 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
48. See generally Tickets at StubHub! Where Fans Buy and Sell Tickets,
http://www.stubhub.com/partners/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (showing that in addition to
being the official reseller for Major League Baseball, StubHub.com also has contracts with
the NHL's Phoenix Coyotes, and Buffalo Sabres, the NBA's Dallas Mavericks, New Jersey
Nets, Washington Wizards, and the NFL's Chicago Bears, Washington Redskins, Houston
Texans, Cincinnati Bengals, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Atlanta Falcons).
49. Glantz, supra note 5, at 269.
50. National Association of Ticket Brokers, http://www.natb.org (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

wide standard of conduct and to create ethical rules and procedures to
protect the public and foster a positive perception of the industry."'" The
NATB's platform further states:
[O]ur primary goal is to represent the interests of legitimate ticket
brokers by promoting consumer protection and educating the public
about our industry. This is done by assuring the public that when
dealing with an NATB member, they are working with an honest,
reliable broker that will deliver what is promised ....
Through self-governance, the NATB has provided enhanced
protections for ticket-buying consumers. NATB has worked with law
enforcement agencies, state and federal legislators and professional
sports leagues and teams ....
In choosing from the myriad resellers of tickets on the Internet and
elsewhere, keep in mind the standards and
52 procedures that are
applicable if you deal with an NATB member.
The NATB posts news stories on its Web site that reflect the association's
views.53 For instance, a July 2007 article appearing in USA Today tells the
story of Amy Stephens, a stay-at-home mom who started Amy's Tickets, a
licensed brokerage in Atlanta, in5 4order to provide supplemental income to
keep her family's finances afloat.
According to Gary Adler, counsel for the NATB, "in free markets the
prices come down. 5 5 For example, "40% of tickets resold on the secondary
market are sold below face value., 56 By the NATB's and USA Today's
count, "47 states [have] laws either in place or in discussion that deregulate
the resale of tickets to some degree. 5 7 Adler reasons that "[b]ecause the
business of ticket brokering is demand orientated,... anti-ticket reselling
legislation is useless. 58
Russ Haven of the New York Public Interest Research Group argues
that "[i]t's a bad deal for consumers ....It will raise the price of tickets
further and make it harder for average fans to get good seats to popular
events." 59 He argues that it is wrong to view tickets as commodities, since
many venues are public (built with taxpayer dollars), and that examinations

51. Id.

52. Id.
53. NATB News Archives, http://www.natb.org/news/index.cfm?pg=newsarchive.cfm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
54. Heather Collura, Movement to Deregulate Ticket Resale is Spreading,USA TODAY,
July 6, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2007-07-04-ticket-resale-deregulation
_N.htm.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
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of deregulation have not demonstrated that prices have come down.
Haven cites a New Jersey study done when a moratorium on its ticketscalping law was enacted; it showed that there was "no benefit to
consumers and data provided by ticket brokers was 'unreliable and selfserving.'"6' The industry response, delivered by Sean Pate of StubHub, was
that "this is happening with or without legislation against it." 62 Either a
workable regulatory framework must be enacted, or else it will be left to
the inmates to run the asylum.
Somewhat ironically, Ticketmaster also believes that anti-scalping
legislation hurts its business. Joseph Freeman, vice president and assistant
general counsel of Ticketmaster, explains that "[w]hen a state maintains a
price cap on tickets being resold, Ticketmaster cannot sell for more than
face value plus fees. 63 Thus, while brokers may decide to break the law
and sell tickets above face value, Ticketmaster, as a reputable national
64
business, is put at a disadvantage by being forced to sell at face value.
Freeman suggests that ideal legislation would have "consumer protections
in place, create[] a level playing field for everyone in the reselling market
and strive[] to maximize the opportunities 5for consumers to get a shot at
tickets in the primary market at face price.,6

As mentioned above, the proliferation of the online ticket resale
industry has coincided with many states either easing or eliminating their
regulations of it. 66 In 1982, less than a quarter of the states had antiscalping legislation in place. 67 That number ballooned to twenty-nine states
by 2005.68 Since then, however, many state legislatures have decided to roll
back their regulations. 69 This is no doubt due to both the propagation of the
online industry (which has enjoyed wide acceptance by the public) and
lobbying efforts by groups like the NATB. These lobbying efforts are being
waged both by Ticketmaster and resale sites like eBay and StubHub. 70 This
effort is still very much in its infancy; as noted above, USA Today reported
in July 2007 that forty-seven states either already have laws in place or
have discussions progressing in the state legislatures to deregulate the
60. Id.
61. Id.(quoting a New Jersey study on the benefit to the consumers of deregulating the
resale of tickets).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 765 n.74.
67. See Diamond, supra note 37, at 74.
68. Jonathan Bell, Student Article, Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem with a Brand
New Twist, 18 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 435,439 (2005).

69. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 765 n.74.
70. Id. at 765.
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industry.7' Whether based on legislatures kowtowing to this emerging
industry and its lobbyists, or simply the realization for many legislators that
it is financially infeasible for police to spend time and resources scouring
the Internet for ticket scalpers in their jurisdiction, there is no doubt that the
current trend is toward deregulation.72
III. 2007 HANNAH MONTANA TOUR: THE TICKET RESALE
MARKET COMES OF AGE
To date, the most pointed example of potential Internet misuse by
ticket brokers occurred in 2007. The hugely popular "teenie bopper" and
Disney star Miley Cyrus/Hannah Montana, launched her "Best of Both
Worlds Tour," a fifty-four-date, nationwide concert tour beginning on
October 18, 2007 in St. Louis, Missouri, and culminating in Albany, New
York, on January 9, 2008. 73 Tickets to these performances "follow[ed] a
distressingly consistent pattern: At 10 a.m. on a Saturday, tickets [went] on
sale, and by 10:05 a.m., all tickets [were] sold. Yet by 10:05, StubHub and
other ticket exchanges already ha[d] a plenitude of tickets listed for the
sold-out event. 74 Tickets had face values of $21 to $66, 75 but parents who
had the opportunity to pay that face value price were few and far between.
Instead, most were forced to go to Web sites like StubHub and pay, on
average, a price of $258 per ticket, not to mention a twenty-five percent
markup comprising StubHub's take.76 Of course, it was ticket brokers that
pocketed these exorbitant profits, many times the tickets' face value, not
the venues or Miley Cyrus.
This story was not unique to the Hannah Montana tour; fans
attempting to purchase tickets to 2007 tours of Bruce Springsteen, The
Police, and Van Halen experienced similar problems.77 The combination of
sheer demand for tickets, pervasive predatory practices by the brokers, and
the most affected demographic-young children and their parents--caused
"[a]ll hell [to break] loose., 78 In the end, the Hannah Montana Best of Both

71. Collura, supra note 55.
72. See Benitah, supranote 25, at 67.
73. Press Release, Walt Disney Records, Singer, Songwriter and Actress Miley Cyrus
Launches 54-Date "Best of Both Worlds Tour" on October 18 (Aug. 8, 2007) (available at
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/googlet?ndmViewld=newsview&newsld=2007
0808005287&newsLang---en).
74. Randall Stross, Hannah Montana Tickets on Sale! Oops, They're Gone, N.Y,
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 34.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Ellen Rosen, In the Race to Buy Concert Tickets, Fans Keep Losing, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2007, at C6.
78. Id.
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Worlds Tour accounted for about ten percent of StubHub's total concert
ticket profits.79
In fact, the frustration over parents' inability to garner affordablypriced tickets for their children led to a class action lawsuit filed in
November 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, against Smiley Miley, Inc. and Interactive Media Marketing,
Inc., Hannah Montana's fan club and the company that runs it,
respectively.80 Many parents paid $29.95 to have access to pre-sale tickets
that would be unavailable to the online brokers.8 ' Because demand
outstripped supply, the plaintiffs alleged that the fan club "deceptively
lured thousands of individuals into purchasing memberships."8 2 Their
complaint further alleges that "the vast majority of the 8members
have
3
expended $29.95 without receiving any appreciable benefit.
It is against this backdrop that various state attorneys general, as well
as Ticketmaster itself, which was losing some of its goodwill, began to
notice and take action. On October 4, 2007, Missouri Attorney General Jay
Nixon responded to the irregularities surrounding the Hannah Montana
ticket sale. 84 Nixon brought suit against three online brokers for allegedly
scalping tickets in violation of a Kansas City municipal ordinance to the
Kansas City concert: GoTickets, Inc.; Tickets Now Entertainment Group,
Inc.; and Ticket Solutions, Inc.8 5 "Investigators from Nixon's office
purchased tickets from these online brokers to the pop star's upcoming
Kansas City concert. They paid $254, $257, and $305 for tickets that had a
face value of either $26 or $56. ' ' s 6 Nixon explained his reasons for getting
involved:
"These companies . . . employ inappropriate means, using
sophisticated software, to hoard all the tickets to high-demand events
and then turn around and sell them at grossly inflated prices .... It's a
blatant rip-off of consumers who attempt
to purchase tickets.., and
87
are met with nothing but frustration."

79. Cf Stross, supra note 74 (stating that StubHub's 2007 annual ticket sales had
surpassed $100 million, of which $10 million was attributed to the Hannah Montana tour).
80. Compl. of Plaintiff, Inman v. Interactive Media Marketing, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-01 109
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/hannahmontana.pdf.
81. See id. at para. 22-23.
82. Id. at para. 27.
83. Id. at para. 26.
84. Rosen, supra note 77.
85. Lisa Wade McCormick, Missouri Scalping Crackdown Gets Results: Online
Scalpers Buy Out Entire Concerts in Some Cases, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Oct. 22, 2007,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/1 0/moscalpers2.html.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon).
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Concurrently with the lawsuits against the ticket brokers, the Missouri
Attorney General negotiated an agreement with Ticketmaster to release an
additional one thousand tickets which were being held by the artist's
promotion company.8 8 "Under the agreement, fans could only purchase two
tickets to the concerts through Ticketmaster's Web site or over the phone.
To prevent scalping, fans [had to] pick up their tickets at the venue's box
office... and present photo identification and the credit card they used for
payment." 89 Such measures rendered the scalpers unable to "hijack
the
90
system, [and] real fans [got] the tickets at the prices set by the artists."
The Arkansas Attorney General made similar moves in his state. At
almost the same time as Missouri Attorney General Nixon was taking
action, Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel launched an
investigation of his own to see whether online brokers were violating
Arkansas' anti-scalping law. 9' Though McDaniel learned of the lawsuit
being brought by Ticketmaster against RMG (discussed in depth in Part
IV), and of Ticketmaster's allegations that brokers could use software to
"cut in line" and block access to tickets for the average consumer, no
formal charges were brought in Arkansas.92
What was incredible, and perhaps most indicative of the current
political climate, was the Missouri legislature's actions in the wake of
Attorney General Nixon's lawsuit. The legislature passed a law that
officially
repealed
their anti-scalping
provision,93
effectively
94
decriminalizing ticket scalping. The law went into effect on November
28, 2007,95 not even two months after Attorney General Nixon brought his
lawsuit against the three online brokers. Whether coincidental or not, it was
a disappointment to Nixon. His spokesman, Scott Holste, lamented,
"[u]nfortunately, the elimination of this consumer-protection tool has come
at a time when the ability to take unfair advantage of consumers has grown
significantly through the Internet."96 Indeed, moves by legislatures like the
one in Missouri seem ironic to the observer; proponents of the legislation,
however, will argue that it's not the ticket scalping itself that is the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
93. Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.395 (2006) (repealed in 2007).
94. See Posting of Phil Miller to The Sports Economist, http://thesportseconomist.com/
2007/1 1/in-missouri-ticket-scalping-at-prices.htm (Nov. 28, 2007, 07:08 EST) [hereinafter
Sports Economist Posting of Phil Miller].
95. See Posting of Chris to Missouri Attorney General Consumer Blog,
http://ago.mo.gov/ConsumerComer/blog/month/9/year/2007/ (Sept. 11, 2007 11:47 EST).
96. Sports Economist Posting of Phil Miller, supra note 94.
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problem, but rather the ability of some to use technology such as that
developed by RMG Technologies, discussed below, to shirk the system. 97

IV. TICKETMASTER, LLC v. RMG TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
On April 17, 2007, Ticketmaster filed a complaint (amended on June
25, 2007) against a small software company, RMG Technologies, as well
as individual brokers whose names are unknown, in California federal
district court.98 The complaint alleged claims of copyright infringement, 99
violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),'0 0 violation of
02
10
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, ' violation of state statutes,'
violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 0 3 and
breach of contract-inducing breach of contract,' °4 intentional interference
10 7
06
with contractual relations,0' fraud,' and aiding and abetting fraud.
Based primarily on Ticketmaster's copyright infringement, DMCA, and
breach of contract claims, the court granted Ticketmaster a preliminary
injunction on October 15, 2007.108 The case was set to go to trial in October
2008.109 However, in June of that year, a permanent injunction was entered
after a default judgment in favor of Ticketmaster.l10
The facts and allegations of the case illustrate a major pitfall in
opening up the ticket industry to market forces. Ticketmaster has achieved
a virtual monopoly in primary ticket distribution in the United States,
owning exclusive ticket distribution rights with hundreds of popular
venues; it sold 119 million tickets worldwide, totaling $6 billion, in
2005."'1 One of the main ways Ticketmaster sells its tickets is through its
copyrighted Web site, ticketmaster.com." 2 In part to stave off ticket
brokers from purchasing large blocks of tickets at once, Ticketmaster
97. Id.
98. Plaintiff's First Am. Compl. at para. 8, Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007), available at 2007 WL 3084480 [hereinafter
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint].
99. Id. at para. 48.
100. Id. at para. 52.
101. Id. atpara. 58.
102. Id. at paras. 64-68.
103. Id. at paras. 73-74, 81.
104. Id. at paras. 84, 95.
105. Id. atpara. 106.
106. Id. atpara. 116.
107. Id. at para. 126.
108. Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116 (C.D.
Cal. 2007).
109. See Stross, supra note 74.
110. Ticketmaster Default Judgment Press Release, supra note 13.
111. Benitah, supra note 25, at 72-73.
112. Ticketmaster, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
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utilizes contractual terms and technological
devices "to ensure a fair and
' 13
equitable ticket buying process.""
First, users of Ticketmaster's Web site must agree to abide by its
Terms of Use not only for ticket purchases, but also when navigating the
Web site itself.' 14The Terms of Use include provisions such as:
Permitted Use
You agree that you are only authorized to visit, view and to retain a
copy of pages of this Site for your own personal use, and that you shall
not duplicate, download, publish, modify or otherwise distribute the
material on this Site for any purpose other than to review event and
promotional information, for personal use, or to purchase tickets or
merchandise, unless otherwise specifically authorized by Ticketmaster
to do so ....
Access and Interference

You agree that you will not use any robot, spider or other automatic
device, process or means to access the Site. Nor shall you use any
manual process to monitor or copy our web pages or the content
contained thereon or for any other unauthorized purpose without our
prior expressed written permission. You agree that you will not use any
device, software or routine that interferes with the proper working of
the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of
the Site. You agree that you will not take any action that imposes an
unreasonable or disproportionately large load on our infrastructure ....
Unauthorized Use of the Site

Any Illegal or unauthorized use of the Site shall constitute a violation
of these Terms of Use. You do not have permission to access the Site
in any way that violates, directly or indirectly, these Terms of Use.
Illegal or unauthorized use of the Site includes, but is not limited to,
using the site to facilitate illegal ticket sales, unauthorized framing of
or linking to the Site, or unauthorized use of any robot, spider or other
automated process on the Site.115
Other provisions prohibit using "areas of this site

. . .

for any commercial

purposes" and
limit the number of tickets one can purchase per
6
transaction."
Ticketmaster contended that RMG's actions violated these terms in a
number of ways. Their complaint alleged that RMG and its customers
routinely made purchases for a commercial purpose and that they
purchased tickets in quantities "in excess of per-customer ticket limits."' 1 7
Also, the defendants "requested more than 1000 pages of the website in
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Ticketmaster Terms of Use, https://www.ticketmaster.com/hterms.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
116. Id.
117. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, supranote 98, at para. 34.
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applicable twenty-four hour periods, and have accessed, reloaded or
refreshed . . . pages and made other
requests . . . more than once during
' 8
applicable three-second intervals.""1
In addition to the contractual provisions with which Ticketmaster
forces customers to comply, Ticketmaster uses technological devices to
protect its Web site from misuse." 9 Ticketmaster claims that it "attempts to
regulate the speed with which users may copy the web pages . . . [and]
limits the number of tickets that may be purchased in any single
transaction.' 20 Furthermore, to protect against "software robots or 'bots'which can give users of such devices an unfair advantage over human
consumers,"12 ' Ticketmaster employs a security device "commonly known
as CAPTCHA ('Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart').', 2 2 CAPTCHA devices use a text box
containing random letters that are obscured by hash marks to distinguish
between human users and automated bots that "cannot decipher and retype
the random characters.' 2 3 Ticketmaster alleged that RMG's software is
"designed to . . .circumvent CAPTCHA and other security measures on
Ticketmaster's website.' 24
The facts laid out in the complaint detail the methodology used in
how RMG interacted with its clients in aiding the brokers' ticket
procurement. Chris Kovach, allegedly one of RMG's clients, "agreed to
cooperate and led investigators to RMG and its Web site,
ticketbrokertools.com, which was open only to its clients.' 25 It was alleged
that a broker must log on to the Web site in order to run "PurchaseMaster,"
and that therefore RMG was actively involved with each use of the
software itself.126 Further, the complaint explained that "[tio design
automated devices that can circumvent Ticketmaster's security measures..
•it is necessary for Defendants to regularly visit Ticketmaster's website...
• [RMG] would see repeated reminders of the Terms of Use and would be
instructed to review them.' ' 127 In a sense, RMG would have had to
knowingly violate the Terms of Use in order to conduct its business.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Seeid. atparas. 13-14.
Id.atpara. 13.
Id. atpara. 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.at para. 28.
See Stross, supra note 74.
Plaintiffs First Am. Compl., supra note 98, at para. 29.
Id.at para. 33.
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In response, RMG claimed that Ticketmaster's complaint amounts to
nothing more than "conclusory assertion[s] of entitlement to relief,'' 128 and
as such Ticketmaster did not state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 129 RMG also made a variety of arguments based on law and
policy. They argued that there cannot be fraud because there was no
detrimental reliance. 30 Specifically, RMG points out that "Ticketmaster
was paid, and received, full price for any and all tickets allegedly
purchased by Defendants and RMG's customers.' 13 1 Also, RMG stated that
"(1) [] purchas[ing] tickets for events at retail prices for the purpose of
reselling them; (2) [] access[ing] public websites, or; (3) [] us[ing] software
or automated devices in order to navigate websites at a quicker pace than
other users" are "not against social policy.' 132 Buried deep in RMG's
motion to dismiss, however, were the inadequate responses to the claims
that ultimately resulted in granting Ticketmaster's request for a preliminary
133
injunction: copyright infringement and violations of the DMCA.
Not surprisingly, Ticketmaster prevailed in its suit. 134 On June 19,
2008, the District Court entered a default judgment and permanent
injunction against RMG, and Ticketmaster was awarded $18,237,000 "for
profits RMG wrongfully earned through infringement of Ticketmaster's
copyrights, inducement to breach contract and intentional interference with
contractual relations.' 35 For its part, RMG's President Cipriano Garibay
maintained that Ticketmaster won only because they could outspend RMG,
stating that "[t]hey won on a technicality because the other team couldn't
afford to show up."' 36 He said that Ticketmaster's view of the facts are
wrong; Garibay stuck to arguments-made in RMG's motion to dismissthat its services were executed by humans in India entering CAPTCHAs
manually, rather than by automatic bots circumventing electronic

128. Defendant RMG Technologies, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the
First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) at 5, Ticketmaster v. RMG
Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Gen Probe, Inc. v.
Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 961 (S.D. Cal. 1996)), availableat 2007 WL 3084484.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id.

132. Id, at 8-9.
133. Id.at 24.
134. Ticketmaster Default Judgment Press Release, supranote 13.

135. Id.
136. Alfred Branch Jr., Ticketmaster Wins $18.2 Million Judgment Against RMG
Technologies, TICKETNEWS.COM, June 25, 2008, http://www.ticketnews.com/Ticketmasterwins-millions-judgment-against-RMG-Technologies6825761.
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also subject individual brokers
safeguards. 137 Finally, this decision may
38
lawsuits.'
to
software
RMG's
who used
V. THE FUTURE OF TICKET SALES IN THE UNITED STATES
The current trend toward deregulation of the online ticket industry is
understandable; it is a burgeoning industry armed with an effective
lobbying effort, and even its biggest competitor, Ticketmaster, is in general
agreement that deregulation is the best approach. Unless the political
climate changes, one can only expect the industry to expand over time,
gaining a more pervasive presence in our society.
Attempts by the government to crack down on similar online
industries have proven ineffective, and there is little reason to believe that
attempts to regulate online ticket scalping would fare any better. Probably
the most famous recent attempt by both private and public actors to protect
an industry from online predation was the recent U.S. Supreme Court case
dealing with online file-sharing, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. 13 9 In Grokster, Justice Souter, 140 writing for a unanimous
Court, wrote "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
is liable for the resulting acts of
steps taken to foster infringement,
4
infringement by thirdparties."' '
As a threshold observation, its important to point out that the
defendant, Grokster, was not itself the innovator of so-called file-sharing
Web sites. In fact, the name Grokster itself was a spin-off of the original
widely used file-sharing software, Napster. "After the notorious filesharing service, Napster, was sued by copyright holders for facilitation of
copyright infringement, StreamCast gave away a software program . . .
the Napster program . . . StreamCast planned to be the
compatible with
142
next Napster."'
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
140. Justice Souter is known as an eccentric in his aversion for all things technological.
Some stories about Souter's disdain for technology include how he once received a
television as a gift, but, has "never plugged it in." JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2007). His views impact his functioning as a
Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 43. Souter does all of his writing with a fountain pen. Id.
Further, he is famous in his opposition to television cameras in the Supreme Court hearing
room, once stating before Congress that "the day you see a camera come into our courtroom
it's going to roll over my dead body." C-Span.org, Cameras in the Court, http://www.cspan.org/camerasinthecourt/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). Nevertheless, he demonstrates a
breadth of understanding of the issues in his opinion.
141. Grokster,Ltd., 545 U.S. at 919 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 924 (internal citation omitted).
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The copyright violations from Grokster and those present in the
context of the online ticket resale market have differences, but Justice
Souter's language from Grokster should prove to bear on cases such as
Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc.143 In Grokster, MetroGoldwin-Mayer Studios framed its suit as "copyright infringements,
alleging that they knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to
enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation
of the Copyright Act."'" Ticketmaster's claim against RMG, as explained
in Part IV, was substantially similar. As noted before, the substance of
Ticketmaster's claim against RMG was that RMG knowingly and
intentionally distributed its software. The software was developed by
examining Ticketmaster's copyrighted work (its website) in violation of its
license, the software enabled users to violate Ticketmaster's Terms of Use,
which also constituted a copyright violation.
Just as Grokster did not prevent file-sharing Web sites from popping
up worldwide, it seems reasonable to infer that a similar pattern (albeit on a
smaller scale) will be seen in the context of online ticket scalping. The
same incentives exist: profitability and the ability on the part of software
designers to create reliable programs. The difference, of course, is that
while governmental regulation of file-sharing is constrained to copyright
protections, there are additional tools available to the government in
regulating ticket resale. Historically, the industry has been regulated at the
state level, but it should not be a stretch for Congress to find a sufficient
basis to regulate the online resale industry as a function of its Commerce
Clause power.
So, where does this leave Ticketmaster, the company with a nearmonopoly on face-value ticket selling?145 As noted above, Ticketmaster
itself has supported deregulation of ticket resale. Indeed, over the past two
years, Ticketmaster has positioned itself as a key player in the secondary
market. First, they launched TicketExchange in 2007, a forum designed to

143. Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102-03
(C.D. Cal. 2007).
144. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 920-21.
145. In fact, Ticketmaster is currently in negotiations to merge with Live Nation, its
principal competitor for primary ticket selling. David Colker, Tiffany Hsu & Randy Lewis,
Concert Fans Boo PossibleDuet of Ticketmaster,Live Nation, L.A. TImEs, Feb. 5, 2009, at
1,
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/businessla-fi-tickemaster52009feb05,0,
1222255.story. These talks began about a month after Live Nation, whose primary business
has always been event promotion, dropped Ticketmaster as its vendor and sought to build its
own ticket-selling operation. Id.This merger is currently being resisted on antitrust grounds.
Id.; see also Press Release, Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., In Light of Springsteen Ticket
Flap, Pascrell Urges Judiciary Committee to Examine Proposed Ticketmaster/Live Nation
Merger (Feb. 5, 2009) (available at http://pascrell.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj08_pascrell/
pr252009.shtml).
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facilitate peer-to-peer ticket transactions. 46 Because of Ticketmaster's
unique abilities, TicketExchange provides features that other online forums
like Craigslist have not been able to duplicate. Many tickets that are
purchased at face value on Ticketmaster can be printed out right on147a
person's home printer; a bar code is used as a means of authentication.
When someone decides to sell their previously purchased tickets, that ticket
is posted on TicketExchange, and when it is repurchased, the new buyer
48
prints off a new ticket with a different bar code (invalidating the former).
Using these tools, Ticketmaster can monitor IP addresses to make sure an
individual is not doing an inordinate amount of business.
Ticketmaster has not stopped there, however, and its recent business
practices have come under fire by a member of Congress. In January 2008,
Ticketmaster purchased TicketsNow for $265 million. 49 TicketsNow was
the second-largest ticket broker Web site, behind only StubHub,5I ° which
had been purchased by eBay a year earlier.1 51 As opposed to
TicketExchange, TicketsNow is a broker-driven Web site. 5 2 Although
Ticketmaster claims that TicketsNow brokers receive no preferred
treatment regarding ticket availability,' 53 Ticketmaster had been directing
54
those on its site who fail to purchase tickets at face value to TicketsNow1
This practice was recently halted after New Jersey Attorney General Anne
Milgram took an interest.' 5 5 Bruce Springsteen, whose tour's ticket sales
prompted the investigation, was similarly very upset with Ticketmaster's
actions. 5 6 Springsteen echoed themes examined in Part II about an artist's
interest in promoting fanbase goodwill: "We perceive this as a pure conflict
of interest ....Ticketmaster is there to ensure that we have a good,
fair
' 57
charges."'
ticketing
normal
plus
value
face
their
at
tickets
our
sale of

146. About Ticket Exchange, Ticketmaster.com, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/te/about
.html#Q 1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Branch, supra note 2 (noting that "financial terms were not disclosed, but reported
estimates place the acquisition as high as $265 million").
150. Id.
151. EBay Buying StubHubfor $31OMin Cash(Business [sic] Week), supra note 47.
152. TicketsNow - Questions & Answers, http://www.ticketmaster.com/ticketsnow (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
153. See id.
154. See Beth Defalco, Ticketmaster Stops Ticket Sale Redirection, PETERSBOROUGH
ExAMINER (Ont.), Feb. 6, 2009, http://thepeterboroughexaminer.com/ArticleDisplay
.aspx?e= 1423182&auth=BETH%DEFALCO,%20THE%20ASSOCIATED%2OPRESS.
155. See id.
156. Beth Defalco, Springsteen Says He's 'Furious' with Ticketmaster, WTPO.coM,
Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.wtop.coni/index.php?nid=l 1l&sid=1593288.
157. Id.
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This dustup has also drawn New Jersey Congressman Bill Pascrell
into the fray. He has called upon the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate the
relationship between Ticketmaster and TicketsNow. 58 In a letter to FTC
Chairman William E. Kovacic, Pascrell wrote that:
I am concerned that the business affiliation between Ticketmaster
and TicketsNow may represent a conflict of interest that is detrimental
to the average fan. There is a significant potential for abuse when one
company is able to monopolize the primary market for a product and
also directly manipulate, and profit from, the secondary market.
Additionally, the speed with which tickets were made available on
Ticketmaster's official resale affiliate site raises questions about
whether TicketsNow brokers were given preferential treatment instead
of competing on a level playing field with average consumers to
purchase the tickets.
. .. I am outraged by how expensive tickets to ball games, concerts
and other shows have become. I understand the economic principles
that have driven up the cost of entertainment, but will not tolerate
unjust business
practices that put regular Americans at a
59
disadvantage. 1
This represents the first time a member of Congress has directly
involved themselves with investigating the online secondary ticket market.
Although the concern here is with the overlap between Ticketmaster's hand
in both the primary and secondary markets, it will be interesting to watch
whether Congress uses this opportunity to take a harder look at the
burgeoning secondary market in general.
What, then, should the regulations look like? The goal should be to
construct a regulatory framework that promotes person-to-person resale
while at the same time discriminating against professional online brokers.
First, the government could make it illegal to host a Web site specifically
tailored to marketing a ticket resale business. Such a regulation would not
have a bearing on transactions done on Web sites like Craigslist. Even a
Web site like StubHub, which does much of its business as a middleman
between two non-professionals, would still be allowed to operate. What
would be regulated, though, would be Web sites like GoTickets.com.
While the brokers would adapt, this seems like a plausible first step.
Second, simply having the federal government get involved would go
far in promoting enforcement of any regulations (perhaps, regulations that
mirror what some states have in place), since federal resources are more
plentiful. If the government does not wish to fully crack down on the online
158. Press Release, Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., Pascrell Seeks Investigation into
Ticketmaster Business Practice (Feb. 3, 2009) (available at http://pascrell.house.gov/
apps/list/press/nj08_pascrell/pr2320092.shtml).
159. Id.
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ticket brokers, they should at least pass some sort of meaningful national
regulation that protects Web sites like Ticketmaster from being hacked by
criminal computer programmers. Such regulations should extend liability to
the brokers themselves, rather than limiting liability to the software
designers for copyright infringement (or, perhaps, a Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act claim 60 ); that would create necessary disincentives for such
brokers to use this technology. After all, as this Note hopes to have
explained, it is the "cutting in line" that is at the root of the problem.
Similar to what Ticketmaster has done with TicketExchange, some
professional sports teams have launched Web sites of their own that allow
fans to unload tickets that would otherwise have gone unused. The service
is most useful for the season-ticket holder who cannot make it to some of
the games. Major League Baseball's Seattle Mariners and San Francisco
Giants have had Web sites to facilitate such transactions as long ago as
2003161 and 2000,162 respectively. At least in the context of sporting events,
such Web sites can go far in privately regulating the secondary market.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ticket resale industry has grown exponentially with the advent of
the Internet. The profits made by online ticket brokers dwarf those of the
ticket giant Ticketmaster because online brokers can sell their tickets for
what people are willing to pay for them, rather than what the artist or
promoter elects to charge. This online industry has of late enjoyed
vindication in some of states' legislatures-most recently in Missouri,
where legislators have taken action to abolish prohibitions on ticket
scalping, viewing the policies as outmoded in this modem age. 163 Indeed,
such arguments are not without merit. States have historically regulated
ticket scalping as a function of their police powers, arguing that ticket
scalpers are nuisances intimidating the event-goers, many times selling
counterfeit tickets to unsuspecting consumers. While still subject to fraud
by counterfeit, when such transactions are done online the nuisance
argument is displaced.
Decisions at the state level to decriminalize ticket resale, however,
could have disastrous consequences for the event-going public as online
brokers purchase increasing percentages of event tickets with the specific
purpose of reselling them at a vastly inflated price. And, as Missouri
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) (2008).
161. Freeman & Gati, supra note 35, at 7-8.
162. Press Release, San Francisco Giants & Tickets.com, San Francisco Giants Launch
Double Play Ticket Window; First-of-Its-Kind Service Enables Charter ... (June 22, 2000)
(available
at
http://www.allbusiness.com/technology/software-services-applicationselectronic/6460234- 1.html).
163. Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.395 (2006) (repealed in 2007).
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Attorney General Jay Nixon's Spokesman Scott Holste recently observed,
"the elimination of this consumer-protection tool has come at a time when
the ability to take unfair advantage of consumers has grown significantly
through the Internet."' 64 Indeed, this problem is exacerbated greatly by
considerations unique to e-business. Software designers are creating
programs that allow the brokers to cut in line and purchase large quantities
of tickets while simultaneously blocking the average consumer from doing
the same.
Proponents of the online industry argue that linking bad apples, like
the software designer RMG Technologies, with the industry in general
conflates the issue. They argue that while using computer programs to gain
an advantage when the tickets go on sale is clearly illegal, simply opening
up the industry to a secondary market geared toward putting tickets in the
hands of those that most value them is a desired service. The latter is
certainly true; the fact that the industry pulled in as much as $10 billion is a
dispositive indicator of its value. However, simply relying on copyright
infringement claims to regulate the industry is inadequate. If the Internet
file-sharing phenomenon has taught us anything, it is that there is always
another software designer ready to fill a void.
Unless the government deems it acceptable to let the brokers succeed
in changing the industry dynamic thereby subjecting every ticket to market
forces, it should take meaningful action to protect the public's right to
purchase a ticket at the price set by the promoter. Similarly, the promoter's
right to sell its tickets for a price it deems fit-a price that takes into
account not only what the ticket garners on the open market, but also
factors that are not fungible such as promoting goodwill or, in the case of a
sports team, promoting a wide fan base that covers the entire spectrum of
demographics it is targeting-must also be protected. Such regulations
should emphasize promoting equitable, desirous transactions between two
people: one with a ticket who is not able to attend, and one who desires to
attend. Such regulations should fight the forces of a growing multi-billion
dollar industry that lines the pockets of middlemen rather than those who
work to put on the production.
This can be accomplished best at the national level with an act of
Congress. Congress' taking charge would solve many of the ambiguities
that exist in the current regulatory framework, and a federal regulatory
scheme might do more to encourage people to follow the law. In a country
where a ticket seller in Arizona can easily purchase and resell tickets to a
concertgoer in Rhode Island, it is appropriate for Congress, pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power, to take action to put consumers first. Perhaps the

164. Sports Economist Posting of Phil Miller, supra note 94.
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recent actions by Congressman Pascrell signal a shift in thinking toward
such national regulation. Indeed, as more incidents such as the recent one
between Ticketmaster and Bruce Springsteen emerge, they will be tougher
for Congress to ignore.
Of course, the promoters themselves can implement tools provided by
the Internet, and it is predictable that many of the sports teams and tours in
the United States will soon utilize market forces in their ticket selling
practices, particularly for the most desirable seats. At least in this context,
the additional income goes to those who deserve it and the predictable
losses in goodwill fall similarly at the responsible party's feet. Such actions
are certainly legal and beyond reproach. However, when the government
allows a parasitic industry to fester, serving neither the public nor the
promoters, turning profits sometimes in excess of the per-ticket value, it is
failing to live up to its duty to protect both the public and legitimate
enterprise.
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